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The Eighteenth-Century Historiographic Tradition and 
Contemporary ‘Everyday IPE’ 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on Adam Smith’s largely sympathetic response to the Rousseauian 
critique of the moral degeneracy of modern ‘economic man’.  It thus emphasises his 
philosophical ambivalence towards commercial society over the textbook IPE 
presentations which ascribe to him an almost wholly unreflexive market advocacy.  In 
doing so it provides important methodological lessons for the study of Everyday IPE 
today.  Arnaldo Momigliano has identified a decisive break in historical method in the 
eighteenth century, of which Smith and Rousseau were key exponents.  However 
unwittingly, contemporary Everyday IPE scholars are the spiritual heirs of the 
eighteenth-century move from writing public histories of the state to writing private 
histories of unnamed individuals who embody the most recent phase of human 
sociability.  The eighteenth-century economic man was conceptualised in relation to 
evolving forms of economic organisation, where the economy in turn was thought to 
reflect the prevailing system of ‘manners’.  Smith united with Rousseau in the belief 
that their society’s bourgeois politeness allowed materialist ideologies to corrupt the 
moral autonomy of the individual.  The historical method underpinning such concerns 
also allows Everyday IPE scholars to ground similarly-styled attempts to understand 
threats to moral autonomy arising from the struggle over economic surplus today. 
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Introduction 
 
This is a paper about the method underpinning the recent discovery by International 
Political Economists of the realm of everyday economic affairs.
1
  There has been a 
marked increase over the last ten years in this sort of work, particularly from members 
of what Benjamin Cohen has latterly christened the subject field’s British School.2  
Everyday IPE is a mode of study which reflects concerns for understanding the 
historically-specific cultural basis of prevailing world economic structures, rather than 
assuming that all economic agency follows the same abstract behavioural type.  The 
aim is to illustrate the variety of ways in which the interaction between the socialising 
pressures of the economy and the development of particular sources of moral 
judgement leads to evolutionary change in the underlying economic form.
3
  The 
recent cultural turn within political economy in general has thus been linked to a 
particular focus on the culturally-situated individual which emerges from social 
theories of the everyday.  This provides the basis for understanding individual 
economic agency as a moralised activity, but where the limits of moral psychology 
are themselves shaped by the cultural production of specific time- and place-bound 
economic identities. 
 
While this is rightly seen as a recent departure within IPE, taking a longer perspective 
shows that IPE’s embrace of the everyday merely mirrors a much more decisive break 
in historical method which occurred at the dawn of classical political economy.  The 
parallels are clear to see in terms of both analytical inspiration and analytical content.  
As the distinguished historian of historiography Arnaldo Momigliano has 
demonstrated, nothing less than a revolution in historical method took place in the 
eighteenth century, and this was propelled to a significant degree by the work of the 
classical political economists.
4
  Until that time, it was conventional to present purely 
‘public’ histories of the state, ones which were constructed on the basis of analysing 
the decisions of key members of the state’s personnel.5  True to the goals of 
Enlightenment philosophy as a whole, though, these public histories were increasingly 
overlain from around 1740 onwards.  What came to prominence in their place was a 
focus on the ‘private’ histories of nameless, but representative, individuals whose 
activities drove the economy to the next stage of progress.
6
  The field of Everyday 
IPE is indebted to the pioneering methodological work of eighteenth-century scholars 
in a manner that has not yet even been acknowledged, let alone adequately 
appreciated.  The analysis in the following pages shows one way in which this 
situation might be rectified. 
 
To do so, however, first requires rather more substantial engagement with the history 
of economic thought than is usually the case in IPE.  At present, there is a tendency 
amongst IPE scholars to understand the evolution of economics in distinctly linear 
fashion: the concepts which are exposed to nineteenth-century marginalist analysis 
and twentieth-century mathematical methods are treated as authentic representations 
of those used by Enlightenment scholars to investigate the nature of market 
institutions.
7
  At best, this overly simplified story can only ever provide a partial 
picture of the analytical space which has subsequently opened up for an Everyday 
IPE.  Despite frequent claims in the broader IPE literature to the contrary, the 
increasing professionalisation of economics in the nineteenth century did not lead to 
the wholesale banishing of normative agendas in favour of mathematical precision.
8
  
The mathematical instincts of at least the first two generations of neoclassical 
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economists were honed – much more often than not – in an attempt to provide a more 
rigorous basis for pursuing normative goals of fair distribution.
9
  The important 
exorcism was much more subtle.  It was the removal from economics, not of the 
whole essence of morality, but of concerns for the constitutive effects of the economy 
on the process through which individuals arrive at moral judgement.  Economics 
remained a deeply moralised subject field throughout this period, yet the dominant 
conception of economic agency was no longer thought about in that way.  Restoring 
such a conception has become a chief task today for those who are interested in 
exploring the possibilities of an Everyday IPE. 
 
What the classical political economists had but the early neoclassical economists did 
not was a concern for how a particular form of economic life has a constitutive effect 
on an individual’s judgement about the world.  This concern was initially brought to 
the fore in the shift in historical method from public to private histories in the 
eighteenth century.  It typically involved the incorporation of sentimentalist moral 
psychology into the historical study of evolving forms of everyday existence.
10
  The 
new history sought to explain the relationship between the increasingly productive 
economies of the time and the increasingly prominent bourgeois politeness on which 
the most recent processes of economic change had been founded.
11
  Moral judgement 
was not something to be passed in a purely extrinsic manner after the economic 
activity had been undertaken.  In Enlightenment thought it was fully endogenised as a 
crucial element of contemplating and then deciding upon the action itself.  The 
ensuing focus on an economic community’s underlying structure of ‘manners’ might 
look a little out of place to the modern-day reader, transcended as it has been by more 
contemporary concerns in Everyday IPE for issues of identity construction.  Yet, this 
at heart is largely two ways of talking about the same thing. 
 
There is much to learn for contemporary IPE, then, from going back to a debate about 
bourgeois virtue that is now more than 250 years old.  The main line of division in 
that debate emerged from the publication of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments in 1759, which is increasingly being viewed by specialist Smith studies 
scholars as at least in part a response to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s full-blooded critique 
of the deceit and deception into which the early manifestations of commercial society 
lured the unwitting individual.  Smith wrote an appreciative article for Alexander 
Wedderburn’s short-lived Edinburgh Review in 1756, in which he drew his Scottish 
readers’ attention to the prescience of Rousseau’s damning indictment of commercial 
society’s corruption of the moral autonomy of the individual.12  His later Theory of 
Moral Sentiments tackles Rousseau’s critique head-on, accepting significant elements 
of his characterisation of corrupted everyday life but asking nonetheless whether there 
were still reasons to support the burgeoning commercial society in preference to 
available alternatives.
13
  Significantly for what is to follow, the work of both men 
reflected the prior structural break in historical method from public to private 
histories, each building his respective theory around the economic actions of an 
ordinary yet individually unnamed person.
14
  The ambivalent tone in which Smith 
wrote about commercial society tends to get lost in IPE in favour of a less reflexive 
reading of The Wealth of Nations and its key passages on the nature of market-based 
economic life.
15
  However, the central question with which he wrestled in response to 
Rousseau – the question of how the economy shapes particular patterns of economic 
agency in potentially de-moralising ways – bears revisiting.  It is once again, today, 
the question around which so much Everyday IPE revolves. 
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The paper proceeds in three stages in an attempt to demonstrate the importance of 
such links.  The aim throughout is to bring to light methodological lessons from the 
history of historiography for contemporary Everyday IPE.  To that end, the first 
section focuses on Momigliano’s account of the rise of private histories in the 
eighteenth century as a challenge to more conventional forms of state-based history.  
The second section introduces the content of Rousseau’s critique of commercial 
society, demonstrating the extent to which it relied in Momigliano’s terms on the new 
trend in writing history.  The third section does likewise for Smith’s largely 
supportive response, highlighting his concern for the way in which market-based 
decision-making impacted adversely upon the individual’s ability to undertake 
economic agency in line with principles of moral propriety.  The conclusion offers 
further commentary on the significance of the analysis for how to do Everyday IPE 
today. 
 
Before the analysis begins in earnest, though, it is important that two sets of 
contextualising comments are offered.  The first is designed to locate my piece within 
the existing, but still very much embryonic, field of Everyday IPE.  The whole 
concept of Everyday IPE remains something which tends to be alluded to rather than 
placed in direct typological form.  Almost certainly the most comprehensive and best 
of the limited number of introductions to the nascent field is that which sets the scene 
for the subsequent chapters in John M. Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke’s Everyday 
Politics and the World Economy.
16
  They suggest that it is possible to identify two 
separate trajectories in the IPE literature which focuses on the social dynamics of the 
everyday. 
 
One might usefully be thought of as the ‘everyday politics’ approach, where the aim 
is to explain how existing economic structures have been undermined and new ones 
have been brought into being through small-scale local activities which begin as 
individual enactments of agency but subsequently snowball through mimetic 
strategies into something approaching collective action.  There needs to be no 
formally articulated protest in the public sphere for such action to result in structural 
economic change if it renders prevailing structures increasingly ungovernable.
17
  The 
other trajectory currently visible within the literature might equally usefully be 
thought of as the ‘everyday life’ approach.  In this conception of the relationship 
between the structures of the world economy and individual economic agency, the 
task is to explain the sources of the socialising pressures which reward agents for 
enacting their preferring subjectivity in line with the reproduction of prevailing 
structures.  In providing psychological comfort and often material advance for people 
who project the sense of ordinariness consistent with dominant cultural conceptions of 
the good life, the realm of the everyday can thus be a normalising force.
18
 
 
It is far from straightforward to situate the work of eighteenth-century social theorists 
exclusively in either of these traditions; the same, by extension, applies to my 
discussion here.  In general, Enlightenment thinking was oriented towards such large 
existential questions as to prevent it from being limited to only one of the everyday 
approaches.
19
  In an important sense, both Rousseau and Smith worked fluidly across 
what is only ever, in any case, a heuristic boundary between everyday politics and 
everyday life.  They were interested in the cultures of consumption which legitimated 
the spread of increasingly self-regarding behaviour (‘everyday politics’), but they 
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were just as interested in the way in which the process of legitimation was rooted in 
structures of decency which had no obvious historical parallel (‘everyday life’).  The 
development of new interpersonal relationships of politeness created forms of 
communicative action based on deference to possessions, which in turn caused the 
economy’s productive potential to be increasingly harnessed to demands for 
possessiveness.  However, satisfying such demands was also a feature of maintaining 
the returns to capital on which the accumulation function of commercial society 
depended.  In this way, the work of both Rousseau and Smith can be seen as a pre-
emption of the ‘cultural political economy’ approach which Jacqueline Best and 
Matthew Paterson suggest underpins all studies of the everyday realm in IPE.
20
  They 
attempted to trace the history of the cultural processes which were embedded in the 
present-day economy, but at the same time they critiqued those processes for what 
they deemed to be their regressive impact on agential self-actualisation. 
 
The fact that both Rousseau and Smith were ambivalent about the model individual of 
commercial society leads directly to my second contextualising observation.  
Rousseau has been almost entirely overlooked as an historical source in IPE, albeit for 
reasons which are difficult to discern.  Perhaps it is because so much of IPE is set up 
on the basis of what Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze have called its “tripartite 
pedagogical framework” of liberalism, economic nationalism and Marxism.21  
Rousseau’s work is difficult to reconcile with the historical antecedents of any of 
these positions, so the more that they are treated as the outer limits of the field the less 
room there is likely to be within it for him.  Smith, meanwhile, has typically been 
appropriated by the IPE textbooks as the standard-bearer of the liberal pole of the 
tripartite structure.  Yet as Stephen Rosow has argued to extremely good effect, this is 
a specific and highly questionable understanding of liberalism, as well as one which 
appears to be unique to IPE.
22
  It runs almost entirely contrary to Smith’s eighteenth-
century concern for the threat which was posed to the individual’s moral autonomy by 
the specific method of searching for recognition within commercial society.  Instead, 
IPE has seized upon a deeply economistic reading of the aims of liberalism and has 
re-presented Smith through such a lens.  In IPE hands, his whole oeuvre tends to be 
reduced to The Wealth of Nations and it, in turn, tends to be reduced to a highly 
orthodox but historiographically-suspect market-eulogising account of the ‘invisible 
hand’ metaphor.23 
 
The following pages should be treated as a challenge to the orthodox reading of 
Smithian liberalism within IPE.  In this way I seek to correct IPE’s general failure to 
thus far recognise the recent resurgence of activity in the specialist Smith studies 
literature.  This was triggered by the publications which were brought out to 
commemorate the 200
th
 anniversary of the 1776 edition of The Wealth of Nations, and 
it now incorporates the work of two generations of scholars who have learnt to read 
Smith through a much broader lens than the invisible hand metaphor.
24
  Almost to a 
person, the new Smith studies scholars insist that the meaning of any single part of his 
work must be reconstructed through direct reference to his writings as a whole.  At the 
very least, they say, The Wealth of Nations must be read alongside and within the 
context of his earlier Theory of Moral Sentiments.
25
  It is not an exaggeration to say 
that this represents the new orthodoxy of specialist Smith studies scholars, which 
contrasts sharply with the orthodox IPE account of a deeply economistic Smith.  My 
analysis is written from the perspective which now dominates the specialist Smith 
studies literature, and as a consequence it will appear to be a conscious study in 
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heterodoxy when compared with the conventional appropriation of Smithian 
economics in IPE. 
 
 
Momigliano and the Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Historical Method 
 
Most of Arnaldo Momigliano’s observations about how eighteenth-century 
scholarship changed the process of historical writing have been dissected in great 
detail by others working on the history of historiography.  By comparison, one 
comment from his famous paper, ‘Gibbon’s Contribution to Historical Method’, has 
tended to slip through the net.  Gibbon was a contemporary of Smith and Rousseau 
and known to them both,
26
 but most importantly for current purposes he was a product 
of the same intellectual milieu that was responsible for the way in which each 
reflected on the accomplishments of commercial society.  Momigliano argued that 
Gibbon’s writing paid “full homage to the amiable prejudice that history is a theatre 
where you must play your part with appropriate words and gestures”.27  In this way 
Gibbon’s work was taken to be paradigmatic of a process through which historical 
narratives came to be put together at least in part for the effects that they were likely 
to have on their audience.  Histories were increasingly being written by the middle of 
the eighteenth century to tell audiences what sort of people they were and how they 
had become that way.  Chronological accounts of events were deemed to hold less 
interest for readers than thematic accounts charting the development of particular 
types of subjectivity.  In keeping with his presumed paradigmatic status for the new 
history, Momigliano described Gibbon as “the perfect blend of philosopher and 
antiquarian”.28 
 
In his words, the eighteenth-century revolution in historical method was all about 
recognising that, on its own, “an accumulation of facts does not make a history”.29  
Prior to that point, the writing of history was “aimed at factual truth, not at 
interpretation of causes or examination of consequences”.30  As Momigliano wrote 
about this earlier generation, “thinking was not their profession”,31 as they sought 
only to specify essential linearities in unfolding sequences of events.
32
  The generic 
boundaries of historical writing thus came to be challenged, especially the practice of 
equating history with the compilation of texts solely about the evolution of the state.
33
  
The result was an increasing focus on what Marc Bloch has called the ‘knot’ of 
reality,
34
 whereby a focus on individual persons responsible for activating the 
rollercoaster intrigues of high politics was replaced with an alternative focus on 
symbolic personality types who illustrated the everyday conditions of the age. 
 
Enlightenment thinking differentiated itself from the prior view that the management 
of the state simply involved the translation of religious edicts into law and that the 
evolution of the state was thereby to be understood as a series of power struggles over 
who got to impose their chosen edict.  The underlying subject matter of history was 
henceforth no longer necessarily the contest between monarchs and aristocrats for 
control of the state and, in particular, for control of the authority structure which 
bound the state to the church.  Instead, for the first time, historians enjoyed the 
intellectual freedom to ask how the institutions of the state – and therefore the role of 
everyone acting within them – were influenced by new cultural forms arising from the 
economy.  For Momigliano, this allowed histories of the present to be written as a 
means of highlighting the new concern for the emergence of custom in social 
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situations in which appearance was as important as being.
35
  Significantly in this 
respect, ‘appearance’ meant not in the eyes of an unseen deity, where the state might 
be called upon to punish those who failed to live by prescribed religious doctrines.  
Rather, it meant making sure that emerging secular trends were observed and that full 
social rewards were claimed for such obedience.
36
 
 
In this way, eighteenth-century historians seized upon the attractiveness of alternative 
and socially resonant art forms to ensure more immediate symmetries of concern 
between author and reader.  The rise of the novel in the early eighteenth century 
provided a blueprint for techniques of connection in this regard.
37
  It was the first 
genre to emphasise the likely emotions of the reader in determining the precise 
wording of its literary formulations, the aim being to create characters that were 
sufficiently familiar for readers to be carried along on an emotional wave of at least 
partial self-recognition when learning about their ups and downs.  With the novel 
established by the middle of the eighteenth century, historians were then able to 
follow the philosophical trend of placing human sentiment at the heart of the 
analysis.
38
  Readers of the time were increasingly accustomed to emotions of 
introspection, doubt and self-discovery when having to come to terms with the 
everyday dilemmas of literary heroes, as well as to using those vicarious emotions as 
mirrors into their own lives.  In these circumstances it was not a large step for 
historians to begin to innovate with markedly similar styles of writing.  The same 
emotions of introspection, doubt and self-discovery consequently began to be ever 
more prominent in their work, challenging readers to think about turning points in a 
country’s history less in terms of the rise and fall of particular statesmen and more in 
terms of what such cycles implied for how ordinary people might project their 
understandings of the self into society.  History therefore became a means of 
addressing readers directly about their own lives rather than indirectly through 
recounting the fortunes of their country’s leaders. 
 
These changes ensured that historical authorship increasingly became a shared 
journey in which readers were invited to pass judgement on the types of cultural 
subjectivities they had embraced within everyday economic life.  According to the 
historiographer, Karen O’Brien, the resulting texts thus became a means for author 
and reader together to create “an interpretive community engaged in a rhetorical 
arbitration of their own history”.39  Momigliano described the process of pre-
eighteenth-century historical formulations as attempts to provide acceptable bases for 
official state decrees: he stressed their “value for the ruling classes”.40  After that time, 
the aim was much more likely to be the interpellation of the reader to a particular 
view of the society that their everyday actions helped to maintain.
41
  All such 
accounts played to and attempted to shape in their own image the reader’s emotions.  
To write history from the middle of the eighteenth century was increasingly to 
construct morality plays that were to be consumed in private but with the intention of 
influencing the public persona of the individual. 
 
It is here that it is possible to identify a distinct parallel with the turn towards 
Everyday IPE in recent years.  Much of that turn has been built upon the suspicion 
that theories of the state in IPE might also be theories for the state.  The concern in 
this respect is that in trying to generate explanations of state behaviour many IPE 
scholars have simultaneously explained away the tensions which every policy choice 
necessarily introduces into the everyday realm.  As such, the sense of struggle 
 8 
immanent in all policy-making decisions gets forced into the background as 
explanations of state behaviour often get folded into the state’s own justification of 
why it has acted in a specific way.  In general, Everyday IPE scholars have been eager 
to reassert the contested nature of all policy decisions by tracing what people become 
whenever they internalise into their own sense of self the full implications of any 
instance of state behaviour.  The frequent invocation from Everyday IPE scholars that 
the subject field should be more than straightforward accounts of what a particular 
country did at a particular moment of time is instructive in this respect.  It is about 
recognising the significance of how people construct particular economic personae to 
mark out where they believe they fit into the social structures which surround them. 
 
Some means has to be found today to connect political ideas about the good society 
with the modes of reader awareness which Everyday IPE scholars typically seek to 
engender, just as was the case two and a half centuries ago with the modes of reader 
awareness on which eighteenth-century history thrived.  In this earlier time, appeals to 
readers’ imaginative capacities provided the link as history began to be written in an 
ever more philosophical manner.
42
  The reader’s imagination was called upon to act as 
an interlocutor between what Mark Salber Phillips has described as the two essential 
narratives of early Enlightenment historical writing: one concerned with sentiments 
and the other with manners.
43
  The use of sentimentalist techniques enabled readers to 
identify with the character traits being presented to them, as well as to seek within 
themselves the appropriate instinctive response.  The manners of any social 
community arise from the outcomes when members of an interpretive community 
observe one another’s actions – either literally or vicariously through reading written 
reports of them – before then allowing those actions they deem to be representative of 
the good society to guide their own future conduct.  This process takes place initially 
in the mind: it takes the form of an imaginative leap enacted against the backdrop of 
social observations.  In this way, the writing of history for an interpretive community 
connecting author and reader merely reflects the fact of living in a society whose 
cultural norms are continually being remade through particular sentimental activities.  
This much is as true today for Everyday IPE scholars as it was for the early 
Enlightenment philosophers.  It leads in both instances to situations in which overt 
demarcations between private and public life are extremely difficult to countenance. 
 
In the eighteenth century, this distinction was almost entirely collapsed through 
focusing on the essential Enlightenment principle of politeness.
44
  Delineating 
acceptable manners played a leading role in the new history, and this involved 
understanding the process through which socially-derived yet individually-articulated 
attitudes were projected into the social realm.  Describing the public actions of public 
men employed to do the state’s will held no such promise for piecing together how 
society might have evolved through various stages into its current form.  Besides, 
Phillips’s two essential narratives of early Enlightenment historical writing came 
together to ensure that the public actions of public men were themselves treated as 
manifestations of what was deemed permissible under prevailing social norms.  As 
the structure of those norms shifted over time in response to changing forms of 
economic life, so too did the understanding of the self that the individual tried to 
promote within society.
45
  As J.G.A. Pocock has argued, “more powerfully even than 
laws, manners rendered civil society capable of absorbing and controlling human 
action and belief”.46  Eighteenth-century historians departed radically from their 
predecessors in increasingly assuming that the law played only a subsidiary role in 
 9 
accounting for changes in both individual behaviour and socialised intuitions about 
appropriate conduct. 
 
This became a focus specifically on the economic aspects of everyday life through the 
emphasis that was placed on the history of commerce in unravelling the story of the 
evolution of the state.
47
  The existence of increasingly institutionalised commercial 
relations – both within and beyond the state – was deemed to be symbolic of an 
economy capable of producing surplus.  As that capability embedded potential sites of 
conflict, the arrival of an age of surplus was thought to require new political and 
moral structures in order to contain likely flashpoints.
48
  Acting within those 
structures, economic agents were required to embody new subjectivities, donning 
masks of politeness to guard against unseemly struggles over surplus and their 
associated ideologies of possessive individualism.
49
 
 
The most celebrated account of such ideas amongst eighteenth-century historians was 
David Hume’s articulation of the ‘doux commerce’ thesis.50  Here, the necessity of 
presenting oneself in a favourable light to one’s trading partners required the genuine 
embrace of what Deirdre McCloskey has called the ‘bourgeois virtues’ of honesty, 
trustworthiness, hard work and prudence.
51
  The economic man of Hume’s doux 
commerce was scrupulous in the attention he paid to presenting himself as a virtuous 
individual.  More generally, he was designed to show that observable patterns of 
economic agency were produced historically as the economy was guided sequentially 
through a series of emergent social objectives.
52
  The specific structure of politeness 
he was deemed to personify would have been meaningless were it not that economy 
and society had evolved into the commercial stage.  Yet to act like the economic man 
of Hume’s doux commerce first requires the ability to imagine acting in that way.  
Overall, eighteenth-century historians were as interested in the unobservable presence 
of human thought in the moments preceding action as they were in the observable 
presence of action itself.  Shifts in the dominant form of economic life were thereby 
attributed, as much as anything else, to products of the mind increasingly being 
manifested as social norms.
53
  The individual was thus placed centre stage in the 
writing of history, even when no named people featured in the account.  The appeal 
was rather to readers to connect themselves to past manifestations of the state if they 
were to understand their own place in history.
54
  The boundaries between what 
counted as public and what counted as private were thereby rendered deeply 
unstable.
55
 
 
In order to achieve such an outcome, however, it was necessary for the new history to 
rely on the conjectural method.  That is, historicising the present entailed the creation 
of abstract individuals from the past of purely hypothetical form, on the assumption 
that the comparison between the two could unlock important insights about how life 
had latterly come to be lived.
56
  Although never described explicitly as such, the same 
conjectural method, I argue, today dominates research undertaken in the name of 
Everyday IPE.  The generic categories of subjectivities which Everyday IPE scholars 
use in their discussion of the influence of cultural norms on economic agency are 
abstractions in the same way as Gibbon, Hume, et al. first began 250 years ago to use 
abstract personae to present historiographies of society.  The focus on subjectivities 
created in and through engagement with the economy tie the two forms of analysis 
very closely to one another.  In content, too, the private histories of Enlightenment 
thinking continue to resonate today.  This is particularly so when asking what 
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individuals must be required to relinquish in terms of their own moral autonomy if 
they are to manifest the character traits best suited to economies which promise to 
make them materially better off.  The positions in this debate were laid down most 
vigorously in their original form by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith, which 
in turn also makes them important – albeit entirely accidental – precursors of 
contemporary Everyday IPE.  It is to their work that I now turn in the final two 
sections of the paper, as I attempt to establish firmer intellectual foundations for the 
conduct of Everyday IPE today. 
 
 
Rousseau and the Moral Threats of Commercial Society 
 
In his Letter to d’Alembert, Rousseau, once a revered playwright attracting the esteem 
of Parisian high society, turned his fire on the very structure that had helped to make 
his name.
57
  His attack on the theatre was a mixture of the sardonic and the savage, 
and it was directed in a manner that was designed to bring maximum hurt to the 
people who had previously looked up to him.  He wrote a coruscating account of the 
way in which the theatre revelled in the corruption of the individual,
58
 presenting for 
audience acclaim characters that represented the very worst forms of excess in a 
society in which the struggle over surplus led to all manner of personal conceit.
59
  In 
this, one of his least discussed tracts, Rousseau operated with an inversion of 
Momigliano’s later observation that Enlightenment scholars had turned history into 
theatre.
60
  In Rousseau’s mind, what had become so insufferable about the theatre was 
that it reflected the history of fallen humanity back to an audience of the fallen for the 
purpose of its entertainment.  It thereby invited people to glorify the fact that they had 
become increasingly alienated from their ‘natural selves’.61 
 
Rousseau’s concern was that the theatre of his day cemented forms of life through 
which individuals took their cues about how to act from paying closer attention to 
responses to other people’s actions than to protecting themselves from the potentially 
alienating influence of social conformity.  The theatre thereby naturalised the 
experience of being a member of an audience and of constantly living within the 
“empire of opinion”.62  Yet, this in itself merely reflected the distancing frame 
enacted at the moment at which the economy first began to provide incentives for 
separating appearance from being.
63
  According to Rousseau, the struggle over the 
surplus that commercial society routinely produced created a means for people to act 
in a manner that was unbecoming to their natural selves and to cloak their actions in a 
veil of feigned politeness.
64
  Hume’s progessivist ideology of doux commerce, in 
which the move to commercial society ushered in real and lasting benefits to the 
manners on display, was therefore entirely turned on its head.
65
  For Rousseau, that 
same move was replete with contrary tendencies, whereby individuals lost their sense 
of wholeness by creating for themselves “factitious” subjectivities, ones designed to 
elicit others’ praise but that lead ultimately to self-deception.66  In his earliest 
published work, the Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences, modern 
manners were ridiculed as entailing nothing more than the “art of pleasing”.67 
 
Rousseau’s most profound criticism of commercial society was that it fragmented the 
modern self, with every individual constantly being confronted with someone new to 
measure their material possessions against and someone new to please with the 
aesthetic attraction of their possessions.
68
  The theatre did nothing to ameliorate this 
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tendency, because it had been appropriated as a training ground for historically-
produced imaginative acts suited to commercial society, whereby each economic 
agent was forced into self-comparisons with multiple others.
69
  Activities purely of 
the mind were harnessed by eighteenth-century historians to enable them to enlist 
their readers in an interpretive community bound together by shared sentimental 
responses to their histories as individuals.
70
  For Rousseau, however, the activation of 
the imagination to tutor the self to exhibit shared sentimental responses was itself a 
factor in humankind’s fall from the natural self.71  Dramatic performances served 
merely to institutionalise such a tendency, playing deliberately to the social 
vulnerabilities of audience members in an attempt to reinforce them.
72
  Rousseau was 
fearful of the extent to which the theatre mimicked public prejudices about the 
righteousness of ownership and therefore rendered those prejudices ever more 
credible as a form of social expression.
73
 
 
As a matter purely of method, none of this differentiates him from the other 
eighteenth-century historians identified by Momigliano as having a primary interest in 
the evolution of manners.  What did set Rousseau apart, however, was the strength of 
the emphasis he placed on the morally degenerative effects of the inter-personal 
comparison that was necessary for perfecting bourgeois politeness.  The aim of such a 
process, he said, was to emerge from it believing that one has in some way bettered 
one’s neighbours.74  However, “assuming pre-eminence as an individual” was, at the 
same time, “the first yoke [socialised man] inadvertently imposed on himself”.75 
 
The success of the eighteenth-century’s new productive techniques was the cause of 
Rousseau’s heightened anxiety about the impact of everyday economic life on the 
moral autonomy of the individual.  More goods being produced meant more goods in 
circulation as economic surplus, leading in turn to more chances to catch admiring 
glances through the display of luxury.  Overall, commercial society facilitated 
potentially innumerable ways of harnessing possessive ideologies to the search for 
social esteem.  The Rousseauian subject had an instinctive, but always socially-
initiated, love of appearance.  It took on new forms of materiality as eighteenth-
century advances in production became established: relative status could be confirmed 
simply by public demonstrations of wealth in consumption.
76
  Rousseau complained 
that the rich only wanted the possessions with which they surrounded themselves 
because they valued the symbolic effect of being associated with goods that were 
consumed exclusively by people of a certain social standing: “The rich think so much 
of these things, not because they are useful, but because they are beyond the reach of 
the poor”.77  Yet, he also noted the entirely transient nature of such possessiveness.  In 
outlining his principles for an education commensurable with nature, he cautioned his 
young charge, Émile, against placing too much emotional value on goods that could 
be lost as easily as they were gained.
78
  The warning was for Émile to avoid becoming 
too dependent on what he could be tempted to think might be derived socially from 
possessions, for fear that otherwise his material goods would come, in effect, to 
possess him.
79
 
 
Reduced to its simplest form, the problem envisioned by Rousseau was the increasing 
subjugation of socialised forms of existence to a theatrical consciousness.  In David 
Marshall’s words, he was worried about how life lived in “the exchange of regards” 
led to an increasingly encompassing “awareness of others as beholders”.80  Such 
forms of agential realisation threaten to entrap the economic man of Hume’s doux 
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commerce.  He is rendered constantly susceptible to forms of self-judgement 
stimulated by the thought of what might elicit praise from other people.
81
  “Why 
should we build our happiness on the opinions of others, when we can find it in our 
own hearts?”, Rousseau asked in his first reflection on such a theme.82  The 
constitution of social norms via the material realm of exchange relations thus stands 
accused of undermining the ‘wholeness’ of the Rousseauian subject.  He clearly 
thought that the move to a commercial society imposed unbearable costs on the 
modern individual by enforcing the embrace of falseness in the search for social 
esteem: “The man of the world almost always wears a mask.  He is scarcely ever 
himself and is almost a stranger to himself”.83 
 
Rousseau developed the concept of amour-propre specifically for describing the 
condition into which the modern individual lapses when falling from the natural state.  
It is a way of acting associated with the competition for esteem, through which 
individuals impose self-oriented ontologies onto the struggle to consume the 
economic surplus produced socially.
84
  In Rousseau’s characterisation it emerged as a 
historically-enacted variety of self-love designed to offer legitimation for the private 
expropriation of goods arising from public economic activities.
85
  Possessive 
ideologies were compatible with societies in which the presentation of affective selves 
was governed by amour-propre, but only with societies of that nature.  Commercial 
society became a specific object of criticism for Rousseau because it offered the 
greatest incentives yet witnessed in human history for individuals to focus their 
attention on using material goods rather than the development of their character as a 
signal for what sort of person they wished to be known as. 
 
Rousseau believed that commercial society elevated the merit associated with the 
display of possessions to an unhealthy degree, consequently inflaming the pride in 
distinctiveness which is evident whenever one individual constitutes a sense of self 
relative to other people.  When living in the natural state, the individual requires only 
a morally harmless self-absorption to secure day-to-day survival.  Yet this is turned by 
the temptations of commercial society into “a destructive and rapacious form of 
selfishness” linked to the consumption of physically decorous but socially worthless 
goods.
86
  Such consumption arises purely from amour-propre and the perceived self-
worth which arises in commercial society when performing well in the competition 
for esteem.  According to Rousseau, though, creating feelings of distinctiveness 
through the acquisition of possessions of high monetary but debatable use value does 
nothing to promote an authentic and morally intact self.  Indeed, every luxury item 
owned is further proof for him that a self-love born of possessive ideologies 
dominates all other emotive states within commercial society: “if we have a few rich 
and powerful men on the pinnacle of fortune and grandeur, while the crowd grovels in 
want and obscurity, it is because the former prize what they enjoy only in so far as 
others are destitute of it”.87 
 
However, despite such criticisms of the state of the human condition within 
commercial society, the account of the Rousseauian subject contains a definite twist 
in the tale.  Even in the terms of his own theory, the evolution of the human condition 
under the influence of structural economic change is not a history that can be 
escaped.
88
  The Rousseauian subject is locked into the existence of the double 
identities he bemoaned, because time cannot simply be reversed to a point preceding 
entry to commercial society.  As soon as any kind of sociability is first encountered, 
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individuals will always have reason to obscure their natural predispositions behind 
multiple affective selves in the search for esteem.  This is simply an existential feature 
of sociability.  Humanity and humankind’s fall are thereby mutually inscribed into 
one another.  Irrespective of Rousseau’s idealisation of independence, the only way to 
explore what it means to be truly human is to submit to forms of social and economic 
dependence.  As Nancy Yousef puts it, “Rousseau’s natural man should not be 
understood as a model for what human beings might have been, but as a model for all 
they cannot be on their own”.89 
 
As the basis for a moral critique of commercial society, there is little to separate 
Rousseau’s dystopian account of the individual’s loss of virtue in status-directed 
consumption and Smith’s admittedly more mildly-worded contemporaneous work on 
the same subject.  This in itself is an important finding for IPE, where typically 
Smith’s work is taken to be representative of an almost wholly unqualified support for 
commercial society and for the abstract market mechanism to which the organisation 
of that society has subsequently been subsumed.
90
  Analytically, Smith did not follow 
Rousseau directly in drawing a distinction born of conjectural history between the moi 
particulier and the moi commun: that is, between “the self as a discrete, self-absorbed 
entity and the self as the bearer of attributes and dispositions drawn from that self’s 
role in society”.91  Yet he focused just as much attention as Rousseau on the way in 
which the founding principles of the moi commun threatened to collapse into the 
morally degenerative process of attempting to emulate the consumption of wealthier 
people.  In a scarcely veiled attack on the exaggeration within commercial society of 
both status-seeking economic activity and the materiality of human vanity, Smith 
argued that excessive admiration of the material possessions of the rich was “the great 
and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments”.92  The final 
section of the paper now moves on to explore Smith’s position in more detail, all the 
time focusing attention on his methodology of private history. 
 
 
Smith and the Moral Threats of Commercial Society 
 
Smith’s most obvious analytical concern mirrored Rousseau’s in the extent to which 
he understood economic agency to be a historicised phenomenon.
93
  The individual 
does not reflect any transcendent behavioural principle when making economic 
decisions, but instead allows the cultural norms of the surrounding society to 
influence choices about appropriate conduct.  The interaction between the individual 
and a structured system of manners is therefore inescapable, because such systems 
become the backdrop at any given moment to all ideas about proper and improper 
action.
94
  However, Smith’s philosophical work is littered with an undercurrent of 
distrust of the materiality which was valued so highly in commercial society, to the 
point at which that particular system of manners is accused of corrupting the very idea 
of propriety. 
 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments he described “[m]odern good manners” as 
“extremely indulgent to human weakness”,95 where those activities which “serve to 
promote luxury [may] set the example of the dissolution of manners” properly 
understood.
96
  For Smith, contemporary bourgeois politeness both reflected and gave 
incentives to accentuate “the character which [people] think worthy of esteem”.97  
There is a clear echo in this of Rousseau’s disquiet about how what he called the art 
 14 
of pleasing had “taught our passions to speak an artificial language”.98  Smith’s attack 
on the pretence surrounding status seeking in commercial society went as far as the 
suggestion that an inherent falseness accompanied any attempt to differentiate the 
behaviour of rich and poor solely on the grounds of preferring to imagine oneself in 
the place of the rich: “To superficial minds, the vices of the great seem at all times 
agreeable.  [People] connect them, not only with the splendour of fortune, but with 
many superior virtues, which they ascribe to their superiors”.99  As Louis Schneider 
suggests, Smith detected no virtue in personal wealth per se.  “He writes readily of 
‘the sober and industrious poor’, but he has no parallel phrase suggestive of sympathy 
or compassion for the rich”.100 
 
However, the rich were in no sense written off, doomed to live in a moral squalor in 
direct proportion to their accumulated wealth.  It was just that arriving at a position of 
wealth was not in itself reason to presume that a person would use all the advantages 
of that position to enforce in the mind a natural conflation between wealth and 
virtue.
101
  This is one possibility of how the imaginative fellow-feeling Smith 
described as ‘sympathy’ might be enacted,102 and in this way it could be possible for 
the rich to add a social justification for their material privilege by demonstrating how 
they have used it to become a role model of moral rectitude.  However, it must be 
stressed that this is only one possibility.  Another, which Smith believed to be more 
likely, is that the fellow-feeling operates on the basis of the poor falsely ascribing 
virtue to the rich merely for the fact of their riches and notwithstanding any contrary 
content of their conduct.  It was a source of genuine regret for him that: “We 
frequently see the respectful attentions of the world more strongly directed towards 
the rich and the great, than towards the wise and the virtuous”.103  Moral propriety 
might thus be misleadingly attributed to the actions of the rich for no reason other 
than that most people learn to esteem those who are capable of putting more wealth 
on display than they are. 
 
Although Smith did not follow Rousseau directly in treating the affectations so 
beloved of the theatre as a direct analogue of the fall of humanity in the commercial 
age, there is nonetheless a necessary theatricality embedded in his understanding of 
how the history of manners was delivered to readers in the eighteenth century.  In this 
respect, he was a direct exponent of the new approach to history identified by 
Momigliano.
104
  On the subject of avowedly sentimentalist histories, Smith wrote that: 
“by the justness as well as delicacy of their observations they may often help both to 
correct and to ascertain our natural sentiments with regard to the propriety of conduct, 
and suggesting many nice and delicate attentions, form us to a more exact justness of 
behaviour, than what, without such instruction, we should have been apt to think 
of”.105  Yet here there is an important difference between Rousseau’s and Smith’s 
allusions to theatricality.  For Rousseau, all such manifestations were symptomatic of 
the unfortunate history of enhanced human sociability, leading ever onwards to 
individual moral corruption in the quest for material possessions: theatrical 
performances did nothing other than to naturalise that quest.
106
  For Smith, by 
contrast, abstract examples of nameless individuals could be used – much in the way 
of a theatrical cast list – to urge the reader to guard against inadvertently turning the 
moral decline made possible by the material temptations of commercial society into a 
historical necessity. 
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One such example is his character, ‘the man of fashion’.  More precisely, and giving 
an immediate impression of the content of the morality play for which he was being 
activated, Smith called him “that impertinent and foolish thing called a man of 
fashion”.107  His characterisation bordered on character assassination, and it was 
designed to ensure that readers of The Theory of Moral Sentiments were left in no 
doubt that the vanity he displayed in associating himself visibly with the material 
trappings of wealth enfeebled him as a moral role model.  Smith’s tone was so acerbic 
that even today it is almost impossible not to be drawn into a particular interpretive 
community when reading his words.  The instinct he was trying to induce in his 
readers was to understand the history of manners in such a way as to find the man of 
fashion laughable rather than admirable.  He derided the showy possessions with 
which the man of fashion physically adorned himself as mere “frivolous 
accomplishments” compared with genuine acts of virtue, suited only to the tastes of 
“insolent and insignificant flatterers”.108  He is the “lover of toys”, a wastrel dedicated 
to the consumption of “trinkets of frivolous utility”.109 
 
The image of “trifling little conveniences” and “baubles” of affectations also emerges 
in Smith’s characterisation of the ‘poor man’s son’.110  The poor man’s son is the 
person who aspires to be rich on the grounds of imagining the comfort that riches can 
buy, a lifestyle liberated from the constancy of desperate livelihood struggle.  Smith 
wrote that such a man is “enchanted with the distant idea of this felicity”,111 inviting 
his readers to also envision themselves in some such scenario before instantly dashing 
their hopes.  The poor man’s son travels along the road towards increased personal 
wealth, making numerous physical and psychological sacrifices along the way, but 
arrives only to find the destination promised more than it delivered: “He thinks if he 
had attained all these, he would sit still contentedly, and be quiet, enjoying himself in 
the thought of the happiness and tranquillity of his situation”.112  The elision of 
material and moral comfort turns out to be a trick of the imagination.  Like the 
Rousseauian subject, once Smith’s poor man’s son has unlocked the desire to live 
within the opinion of others, it makes him constantly restless.  He is always looking 
for new opportunities to distinguish himself from his peers through his possessions, 
searching for materially-based evidence of his superiority.  However, all he ends up 
doing is revealing to himself that his possessions are “mere trinkets” with nothing 
other than show value, as well as nothing like a direct substitute for the additional 
opportunities for moral reflection which a wealthy existence can provide.
113
 
 
Underlying the characterisation of both the man of fashion and the poor man’s son is 
Smith’s commitment to the thoroughly Rousseauian idea that a society’s morals co-
evolve with its capacity to produce economic surplus.  According to Charles 
Griswold, he was “consciously nonfoundationalist” in his approach to moral 
sentiments, refusing to ground them in anything other than historically-conditioned 
and historically-specific social conditions.
114
  The Smithian subject therefore reveals 
an essential attachment to conventionalist ontology: individuals discover their sense 
of who they are and of who they should aim to be through being called to pass 
judgement on the propriety of other people’s conduct.115  There is, for Smith, as a 
consequence, an irreducible tension running through commercial society.  Individuals 
get a sense of the type of moral agent they might be only by placing their self-image 
in the opinion of others as a means of observing the different responses generated by 
different presentations of the self.  At the same time, however, the extra productive 
capacity of commercial society means an increased chance of those opinions being 
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irreparably corrupted by the quest for purely gratuitous forms of material wealth.  If 
other people’s opinions constantly replicate those of the man of fashion and the poor 
man’s son, individuals are denied access to their pristine moral selves, because their 
economic agency is reflected back to them through the lens of others’ moral 
corruption. 
 
So far, it seems, still so very Rousseauian.  However, Smith made an important break 
with Rousseau – and, at first glance, also with his own nonfoundationalist ontology – 
in suggesting that there is one principle of moral sentiment which is always capable of 
overriding social opinion.  Smith continually emphasised the individual’s ability to 
distinguish praiseworthiness from praise, as well as to view the former as more 
morally worthy than the latter.
116
  Smith got quite close to reinventing Rousseau’s 
notion of a natural self uninhibited by the experience of sociability when he wrote 
about the original love of praiseworthiness.
117
  However, to be conscious of having 
behaved in a praiseworthy manner of course first requires social interaction if it is to 
be a meaningful emotion.  Nonetheless, Smith hinted at the possibility for the 
individual to recover a sense of self-sufficiency in being oriented towards purely 
praiseworthy activities, even though commercial society appeared more obviously to 
reward what Ryan Hanley has called “the love of praise characteristic of the 
bourgeois”.118  To engage in the struggle to enjoy economic surplus as lifestyle 
adornments is meritorious only to the extent that merit is sought in praise.  Crucially, 
the means of demonstrating that such praise is deserved requires the value system of 
commercial society to be transcended altogether.
119
 
 
The Smithian subject must therefore walk something of a tightrope.  The choice of 
lifestyle is not as straightforward as for the Rousseauian subject, for whom living in 
the opinion of others is an existential necessity in commercial society and can only be 
countered by embracing forms of life which completely reject that society.  The 
Smithian subject lives in the opinion of others as surely when targeting 
praiseworthiness within commercial society as when targeting praise.  It is the content 
of others’ opinion that changes form between the two instances, not the difference 
between the ability and the inability to satisfy one’s sense of self other than through 
the approbation of observant others.  To act in a praiseworthy manner was, for Smith, 
to act with ‘self-command’: moderating the emotions as a means of avoiding overt 
showiness when presenting oneself in public.
120
  The economic virtue that most 
clearly fitted such a template was prudence, through which the thrifty management of 
household affairs allowed for careful financial planning for the future.
121
  This 
corresponds, of course, to a logic of foregone consumption opportunities in the 
present, and in commercial society, where praise results from the relationship between 
individuals and their possessions, it therefore largely takes praise out of the equation.  
Yet, there is an inevitable time delay between the moment of acting through self-
command and the moment at which the approbation of others arises for the 
praiseworthiness of that action.  The positive outcomes for prudential behaviour only 
become apparent over time, and so too, as a consequence, does the endorsement of 
that behaviour in the opinion of others. 
 
The Smithian system allows individuals to compensate for this temporal disjuncture 
by substituting their own judgement on their behaviour for the missing judgement of 
others.  If living in the opinion of others is always a vicarious exercise, it becomes 
doubly so in this instance.  There is a moral good entailed in self-judgement for 
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Smith, enabling a distinctly non-bourgeois contentment to be enjoyed in “that thing 
which, though it should be praised by nobody, is however, the natural and proper 
object of praise”.122  Bourgeois contentment derived from mere praise of possessions 
is, by contrast, “groundless applause”,123 incapable of being activated in any 
meaningful way through self-judgement.  In order to emphasise the significance of 
self-judgement, Smith argued that the modern individual was endowed, “not only 
with a desire of being approved of, but with a desire of being what ought to be 
approved of; or of being what he himself approves of in other men”.124  This enables 
all individuals to be the ultimate arbiter of their own praiseworthiness, providing them 
with the psychologically-comforting ability of imagining in a self-satisfactory manner 
how distinctly non-bourgeois forms of contentment should be viewed by others.  
Smith thus created a “jurisdiction of the man within” to render possible behaviour 
built on self-command.  This applies even though commercial society privileges the 
“jurisdiction of the man without”,125 or what Rousseau described as the masks of 
social artifice.
126
 
 
The difficulty that Smith encountered in fully repudiating Rousseau’s critique of 
commercial society is evident in the fact that there is no fail-safe mechanism 
preventing the internalisation of moral judgement from falling foul of self-deception.  
Smith himself alluded to the very real possibility that ‘the man within’ might be 
sufficiently corrupted by the materialistic instincts of social opinion to allow those 
instincts to override more reputable forms of moral judgement.
127
  He wrote that: 
“The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers, and, what may seem 
more extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested admirers and worshippers, of 
wealth and greatness”.128  In such circumstances, the individual’s internal arbiter of 
appropriate decision-making becomes nothing more than a personalisation of 
Rousseau’s theatre, reflecting the prejudices and superstition of commercial society 
back onto the self.
129
  The search for forms of praiseworthy behaviour might therefore 
become prey to an inadvertent process through which the individual’s moral self 
merely mimics the prevailing materialism of commercial society.  There is nothing in 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments to say why this should definitively not be the case, 
which leaves Smith’s ethical defence of commercial society looking somewhat half-
hearted. 
 
The qualification ‘definitively’ might in this respect be more important than it first 
appears.  The text of The Theory of Moral Sentiments is littered with instances in 
which Smith bemoaned the fact that the “gaudy and glittering” provided the most 
obvious source of emulation in commercial society, especially when this was 
preferred to “humble modesty and equitable justice” in the search for recognition.130  
This makes it look as though his defence of commercial society was distinctly, rather 
than only somewhat, half-hearted, given his concerns that it bred an instinct towards 
possessiveness which was itself inimical to morally pristine forms of imaginative 
sympathy.  “The propriety of our moral sentiments is never so apt to be corrupted,” he 
wrote, “as when the indulgent and partial spectator is at hand, while the indifferent 
and impartial one is at a great distance”.131  Yet, shortly after this passage Smith 
offered something of a counter to his own concern, detailing the effects of a “love of 
system” which might be sufficient to turn the individual away from certain 
manifestations of partiality.  This is a “regard to the beauty of order, [which...] 
frequently serves to recommend those institutions which tend to promote the public 
welfare”.  “We take pleasure in beholding the perfection of so beautiful and grand a 
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system,” he suggested, “and we are uneasy till we remove any obstruction that can in 
the least disturb or encumber the regularity of its motions”.132  Interestingly for 
current purposes, though, Smith mentioned “faction and fanaticism” by name as those 
“corrupters of moral sentiments” which might be negated by the historically-induced 
appreciation of social order, but not material possessiveness.
133
  The only way to 
extend such instincts to self-regarding consumption remains an awareness of the 
distinction between praiseworthiness and praise, but Smith failed to explain the origin 
of that distinction in a manner consistent with his own theory of the process of moral 
judgement. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It goes without saying that neither Rousseau nor Smith was an Everyday IPE scholar.  
They asked the questions that were of intellectual concern in their own time 
completely unburdened by any professional pressure to frame their thoughts with 
respect to the language, concepts and theoretical assumptions of a distinctly modern-
day academic subject field.  Yet there are sufficient similarities between the style of 
their analyses of commercial society and Everyday IPE to believe that significant 
lessons can be learnt about the latter from further in-depth study of the former.  They 
were representatives of an important advance in Enlightenment thinking which can be 
viewed as a precursor to how Everyday IPE scholars establish the essence of their 
break with IPE orthodoxy. 
 
The work of Rousseau and Smith reflects the significant eighteenth-century shift in 
historical method, one which enabled the writing of history to be liberated from the 
focus on the public actions of public men.  They could not have asked the questions 
they did about the co-evolving structures of politeness and production had there not 
been a growing concern for understanding changes in everyday experience through a 
perspective emphasising distinctly private histories.  It was this that saw them focus 
on nameless yet representative individuals of the age in an effort to highlight the 
moral threats posed by the materialist ideologies of commercial society.  Even a fairly 
cursory reading of their work is likely to be sufficient to reveal the numerous 
characters they created along such lines when attempting to trigger interpellative 
moments of self-recognition amongst readers.  These characters represented a new 
departure in the methodology of history insofar as they were theoretical abstractions 
rather than empirical examples.  However, they became historically significant in 
their own right insofar as they were plausible abstractions invoking feelings of 
familiarity.  They did their job by telling people what they were in danger of 
becoming, even if learning this about themselves was somewhat unsettling. 
 
Everyday IPE likewise implores its readers to look into themselves in its accounts of 
more recent examples of the way in which changing structures of economic 
organisation evolve their own specific behavioural rationalities.  Entirely consistently 
with their eighteenth-century counterparts, such study implies a style of writing which 
is produced at least in part for the effects it will have on its target audience.  The 
objective of Everyday IPE is every bit as much to stimulate moments of self-
awareness amongst audience members as it was for Rousseau and Smith, asking 
people to look inwards to themselves rather than outwards to the state.  The primary 
source of interest in both is with the emergence of particular forms of customary 
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behaviour in particular social situations, as well as in the way in which those customs 
imply particular economic subjectivities.  Viewed from such a perspective, the 
similarities between the two bodies of literature is so pronounced as to be extremely 
eye-catching.  Even the questions that divided the classical political economists across 
analytical and normative lines are paralleled in contemporary IPE.  Those questions 
are whether prevailing economic subjectivities are built upon social masks which hide 
the moral degeneracy of those who display them and, if so, whether this is too high a 
price for economic improvement. 
 
Can Everyday IPE flourish in the absence of knowledge about how the rise of 
political economy was itself founded on a specific Enlightenment shift in the method 
of writing history?  Perhaps it can, but it would be grounded on much surer footings 
with an appreciation of Momigliano’s description of the onset of private histories in 
the eighteenth century.  The original rationale for political economy was to assert that 
there was more to the evolution of forms of economic life than the power of the state.  
Harnessing the historian’s instincts to the substantive focus on contextually-specific 
manners was the eighteenth-century answer to how to avoid an overly restrictive field 
of study for political economy.  Reactivating a similar agenda today to cast light on 
the specific subjectivities and forms of contemporary economic agency would seem to 
be an admirable objective for Everyday IPE. 
 
Equally, can Everyday IPE illuminate the most important normative issues related to 
the management of the global economy in the absence of knowledge about how the 
rise of political economy was also founded on sentimentalist philosophical history?  
Again, perhaps it can, but once more it would be grounded on much surer footings 
with an appreciation of Momigliano’s description of Enlightenment scholars’ use of 
behavioural ideal-types to bring the reader into the text.  Rousseau and Smith continue 
to stand at the apex of the technique of enlisting the reader into the normative cause of 
the historical narrative with which they are faced.  Forging an interpretive community 
between author and reader was the eighteenth-century answer to how to consciously 
moralise the evolution of economic life.  As the struggle over enhanced levels of 
economic surplus today leaves even more asymmetric patterns of poverty and wealth 
than it did in Rousseau’s and Smith’s time, reactivating a similar agenda would also 
seem to be an admirable objective for Everyday IPE. 
 
Yet this in turn implies an even more fundamental break with IPE orthodoxy than the 
current crop of Everyday IPE scholars have thus far envisaged.  If the search for its 
foundations means uniting Everyday IPE with similar styles of analysis to be found 
within classical political economy, then a turn towards historiography is essential.  
However, this must be a much deeper historiographical process than is currently in 
evidence within IPE, where it is usual to read the history of economic ideas 
backwards in an attempt to render the work of much older scholars compatible with 
the framework of ideas which belongs to modern IPE theory.  It is about recognising 
that there is more to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scholarship than is captured 
by orthodox IPE’s tripartite pedagogical framework of liberalism, economic 
nationalism and Marxism, as well as that the textbook appeal to Smith, List and Marx 
as the respective founders of these positions is historiographically suspect in 
significant ways.  The most robust foundations for Everyday IPE will therefore be 
established through reclaiming the authority of original texts and once again enabling 
them to speak for themselves.  I have made a very small start on this task by using the 
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preceding pages to place Smith back into the historical context of his engagement 
with Rousseau, albeit thus presenting a Smith who is largely unknown in IPE.  The 
difference could hardly be greater between this Smith and the IPE textbook depiction 
of a purely economistic Smith who had nothing but praise for the efficiency of market 
outcomes.  This suggests that the textbooks might themselves be a barrier to 
developing the historiographical depth which, I argue, is necessary to fully exploit the 
potential of Everyday IPE. 
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